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SUMMARY 
Engineering design processes are necessary to attain the requisite standards of integrity for high-assurance 
safety-related systems. Additionally, human factors design initiatives can provide critical insights that 
parameterise their development. Unfortunately, the popular perception of human factors as a “forced 
marriage” between engineering and psychology often provokes views where the ‘human factor’ is perceived 
as a threat to systems design. Some popular performance-based standards for developing safety-related 
systems advocate identifying and managing human factors throughout the system lifecycle. However, they 
also have a tendency to fall short in their guidance on the application of human factors methods and tools, 
let alone how the outputs generated can be integrated in to various stages of the design process. This case 
study describes a project that converged engineering with human factors to develop a safety argument for 
new low-cost railway level crossing technology for system-wide implementation in Australia.  
The paper enjoins the perspectives of a software engineer and cognitive psychologist and their involvement 
in the project over two years of collaborative work to develop a safety argument for low-cost level crossing 
technology. Safety and reliability requirements were informed by applying human factors analytical tools that 
supported the evaluation and quantification of human reliability where users interfaced with the technology. 
The project team was confronted with significant challenges in cross-disciplinary engagement, particularly 
with the complexities of dealing with incongruences in disciplinary language. They were also encouraged to 
think ‘outside the box’ as to how users of a system interpreted system states and behaviour. Importantly, 
some of these states, while considered safe within the boundary of the constituent systems that 
implemented safety-related functions, could actually lead the users to engage in deviant behaviour. 
Psychology explained how user compliance could be eroded to levels that effectively undermined levels of 
risk reduction afforded by systems. Linking the engineering and psychology disciplines intuitively, overall 
safety performance was improved by introducing technical requirements and making design decisions that 
minimized the system states and behaviours that led to user deviancy. As a commentary on the utility of 
transdisciplinary collaboration for technical specification, the processes used to bridge the two disciplines 
are conceptualised in a graphical model. 
 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Engineering design processes are critical for 
attaining the requisite standards of integrity for 
high-assurance safety-related systems, but human 
factors-based design initiatives can also provide 
critical insights to parameterise their development. 
Unfortunately, the popular perception of the 
human factors discipline is that of a “forced 
marriage” for want of a better expression, between 
the disciplines of engineering and psychology. 
This perspective of human factors has a tendency 
to provoke views where the unpredictability of the 
human element is perceived as a vulnerability or 
threat to systems design. On balance, the view of 
the human factor as a limiting agent for systems 
design is not unfounded, but it is important to note 
that the ever-increasing complexity of systems 
drives these patterns, rendering human factors 
input in engineering design more important than 
ever before. In recent years, complexity theory has 
advocated a complex systems view of systems 
where complexity is gradually becoming the 
defining characteristic of technology [1, 2]. This 
theory describes how failures emerge 
opportunistically from the very systems put in 
place to prevent them, and explores the notion of 
normalisation of deviance. This is used to explain 
how compliance could actually give rise to hazards 
through deviant behaviours, and erode to a level 
that effectively reduces the risk reduction afforded 
by the system. Ironically, the perspective that the 
human element is a palpable threat to systems 
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design is ideological and a highly judgemental 
single-factor explanation for the causes of failure, 
undermining the sheer dynamism, complexity and 
opacity in the networking of systems interactions 
and processes in the technology of today [3]. To 
some extent, these views are reflected in a 
number of performance-based standards for 
developing safety-related systems. Most mention 
the importance of human factors as a thermometer 
to gauge human behaviour with respect to 
systems design, but fall short on the guidance. 
This will be a recurrent theme throughout this 
paper, largely because the complexity of systems 
is rivalled only by the under specification of how 
they may influence human performance. In 
practice, this under specification and practice of 
‘silo thinking’ can create a lot of problems for 
human reliability in systems design.   
One way to get over these issues is to recognise 
that the collaborative dynamic in systems design is 
inherently interconnected, and any disconnects in 
the design of system states and human factors 
impacts the facilitation in the process, and the 
integrity or usability of the system [4]. Generally 
speaking, facilitation literature lists a number of 
approaches that look beyond single disciplines to 
cross boundaries, ostensible or otherwise (e.g. 
multi-; cross-; trans; inter-disciplinary) [5]. 
Integrating human factors systematically into 
systems design may transcend the boundaries of 
conventional disciplines and engender a greater 
understanding of different perspectives and 
interweave knowledge to anticipate problems and 
create solutions [5-7], building even more integrity 
for high-assurance safety-related systems. 
1.1. Aims and Objectives 
In this paper, we describe the case study of a 
project that converged engineering with human 
factors to develop a safety argument for new low-
cost railway level crossing technology for system-
wide implementation in Australia. The aim of this 
paper is to illustrate the importance of systematic 
integration of human factors in the specification of 
requirements for new level crossing technologies 
in the Australian rail context. The objectives that 
were used to meet this aim are as follows:  
• Provide a tangible example of a rail research 
project where reciprocity in the engineering 
and human factors processes converged to 
strengthen and endorse the safety argument,  
• Discuss the effect of human factors on safety 
in relation to level crossing warning device 
failure modes,  
• Illustrate personal accounts of how trans-
disciplinary learning and collaboration took 
root in the project team (i.e. the authors), who 
were originally educated very traditionally in 
the engineering and psychology disciplines, 
and 
• Conceptualise the processes through which 
knowledge was shared. 
2. HUMAN FACTOR “MATTERS” 
Although the science of human factors has now 
become recognised as a discipline in its own right, 
imbued with the capabilities to expound causation 
for some of the more euphemistic classifications of 
failure (e.g. “Controlled Flight into Terrain”), its 
tension with systems engineering can still be 
observed in some popular performance-based 
standards for developing safety-related systems. 
While these advocate the identification and 
management of human factors considerations 
throughout the system lifecycle, they also have a 
tendency to fall short in their guidance of how 
human factors methods and tools should be 
applied, let alone how the outputs generated can 
be integrated in to various stages of the design 
process.  
For example, the CENELEC standard EN50126-1 
Railway Applications – The specification and 
demonstration of Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability, and Safety (RAMS) [8] states: 
"Humans shall be considered as possessing 
the ability to contribute to the RAMS of a 
railway system. To achieve this aim, the 
manner in which human factors can influence 
railway RAMS should be identified and 
managed throughout the entire lifecycle. The 
analysis should include the potential impact of 
human factors of railway RAMS within the 
design and development phases of the 
system." (pp. 16)  
This excerpt highlights the requirements for human 
factors as an important part of the entire lifecycle, 
but the standard falls short in providing guidance 
and/or tools to point the reader to further literature. 
As a result, engineers or designers aiming to meet 
these requirements will interpret this as they see 
fit, breeding inconsistencies, nuances, and 
assumptions to create yet further disconnects [9].  
In determining appropriate safety requirements for 
systems such as a level crossing warning device 
(i.e. a hazard control for system hazard: collision 
between road and rail vehicle), a risk analysis is 
conducted to identify the hazards at the hazard 
control’s boundary. Appropriate tolerable hazard 
rates (THRs) are then allocated to these hazards. 
THRs at this level should ensure that the hazard 
control is effective in reducing risk to a tolerable 
level for system hazards (i.e. residual risk meets 
THR defined for system hazard: collision between 
road and rail vehicle).  
System designers and developers use THRs to 
determine appropriate levels of safety integrity, 
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failure rates, etc., through an apportionment 
process, for constituent systems that implement 
functions defined in the safety requirements of the 
hazard control.  
At this level, the challenge is to allocate THRs that 
take into consideration human performance at all 
interfaces to the system, ensuring the hazard 
control reduces risk to a level that meets THRs for 
system hazards. This is particularly pertinent for 
degraded modes of operation, where changes to 
function allocation during failures and degraded 
modes of operation can result in additional 
hazards.  
For example, if the system is no longer able to 
perform safety-related functions due to a failure, 
functions that were otherwise entirely provided by 
the system are now entirely or partially allocated to 
humans (often unexpectedly for users of level 
crossings). Human reliability can significantly 
influence effectiveness of the hazard control, 
especially in cases where humans are part of 
detection and mitigation functions of some failure 
conditions. Human reliability in this context can 
affect the persistence of such failures and 
therefore exposure to a potentially dangerous 
condition for users of the level crossing. 
Further complicating matters, intermittent or 
prolonged exposure of system users to degraded 
modes of operation can also affect the user’s 
performance and response to the system, both 
short-term and long-term. Degradation of human 
performance gives rise to additional hazards, 
therefore requiring targets or upper bounds to the 
frequency with which degraded modes of 
operation occur. 
In determining appropriate THRs and reliability 
targets, tools facilitating the quantification of 
human reliability are necessary, allowing human 
performance considerations to be integrated into 
quantitative risk assessment. It is this intimate 
inter-working of both engineering and psychology 
disciplines that are needed to achieve the design 
of systems optimised for human performance. 
Research advocates collaborative work between 
different disciplines as a way of overcoming these 
sorts of issues whilst energising the process of 
systems design and cultivating insight through 
mutual endeavour (e.g. reliability testing). This has 
the effect of not only finding common ground, but 
also weaving knowledge and methods in ways that 
transcend conventional boundaries. The next 
section will outline the scene and background of 
the case study. 
3. DEVELOPING A SAFETY ARGUMENT FOR 
LOW COST LEVEL CROSSINGS 
The Cooperative Research Centre for Rail 
Innovation (Rail CRC), an Australian government 
research initiative, has funded several projects 
aiming to develop and trial a safety argument for 
adopting low-cost level crossing warning devices 
(LCLCWDs) in Australia. These devices are 
intended for deployment at low-exposure sites with 
passive controls (i.e. single track, low road and rail 
traffic volumes). Figure 1 illustrates an example of 
such a site. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Example of a low-exposure level 
crossing with passive controls. 
The LCLCWD project is comprised of engineers 
and cognitive psychologists (amongst other team 
members). This mix of expertise cultivated ‘out-of-
the-box’ thinking in the way the safety argument 
was developed, not just from a systems view, but 
also from the perspective of policy and practice. 
Although both perspectives agreed fundamentally 
on the need for a risk-based system-wide 
approach to upgrade low-exposure level 
crossings, the manner in which they approached it 
was very own-discipline oriented. This was 
reflected in the existence of a scoping project that 
sought to develop an interventions framework for 
level crossing upgrades [10]. At the same time, the 
Rail CRC developed a proposal for LCLCWDs. 
The reduced cost would allow railways to update a 
greater number of level crossings across the 
network, and in doing so, provide an earlier and 
much larger safety benefit compared with an 
incremental upgrade based on existing type-
approved technology. This was the point at which 
both projects collided and cross-disciplinary 
collaboration commenced (between the authors). 
In essence, the larger more technically robust 
project with pragmatic applications absorbed the 
principles of the higher-level and people-centred 
scoping project.  
3.1. Low Cost Level Crossing Warning 
Devices 
The design of LCLCWDs is characterised by the 
use of innovative technologies aimed at 
significantly reducing lifecycle costs [11, 12]. An 
example of costs of level crossings that can be 
reduced through the application of innovative 
approaches and technologies include: 
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• Installation and civil works such as 
trenching, cable runs, under road/under 
track bores and track improvement work 
(e.g. ballast cleaning, head bonding, etc.), 
• Provision of mains power, 
• Re-commissioning of seasonal lines, and 
• Preventative and corrective maintenance. 
A significant component of the cost of conventional 
level crossing warning devices is associated with 
the required levels of safety integrity. Thus, the 
higher the level of integrity, the more demanding 
the development processes, which are reflected in 
relative development costs. For example, wireless 
technology and solar power may reduce the costs 
associated with trenching, under-road bores and 
provision of mains power, particularly as these 
activities comprise as much as 50% of the total 
cost of a level crossing installation. However, this 
can result in increased system complexity due to 
the need to power each component independently 
with solar power, increasing the cost of meeting 
the warning safety function’s tolerable hazard rate.  
Inevitably there is also a trade-off between safety 
integrity and reliability in achieving safety targets. 
Safe failure modes as a result of reliability issues 
are anecdotally known to lead to additional 
hazards, however determining appropriate and 
acceptable levels of reliability to avoid giving rise 
to these additional hazards is a key issue that 
need to be addressed. 
3.2. Approaching Levels of Safety Integrity 
and Risk 
Many railways require that all signalling technology 
be developed to the highest level of safety integrity 
(i.e. SIL4). However in most cases, this is as a 
result of the lack of a safety argument supporting 
lower levels of integrity for low-exposure level 
crossings. The Rail CRC project is partway 
through the development of an argument to 
support a risk-based approach for the adoption of 
low-cost level crossings, such that the level of 
safety integrity required for the safety function: 
warn level crossing user of approaching train, 
would need to be at least commensurate to 
magnitude of risk reduction required to meet the 
tolerable hazard rate (THR) for the system-hazard: 
collision between road and rail vehicle.  
As such, for level crossings with lower risk (e.g. 
lower-exposure level crossing with passive 
controls), the magnitude of risk reduction required 
to meet the respective THR would be less than 
that required for a level crossing with higher risk 
(e.g. high exposure urban crossing). In order to 
support the argument, a comprehensive safety 
justification was developed and was comprised of 
the following elements: 
• System definition,  
• An assessment of baseline risk and the 
risk from LCLCWDs, 
• Risk acceptance criteria (definition of 
tolerability of risk and tolerable hazard 
rates),  
• A cost benefit analysis, and 
• An assessment of legal duty (reduction of 
risk so far as is reasonably practicable), 
and whether the acceptance criteria were 
met. 
One of the challenges in developing a safety 
argument for new technologies was the definition 
of quantitative safety targets (THRs) for hazards of 
the system that would result in dangerous failure 
and therefore loss of the safety function. In the 
case of LCLCWDs, these would be hazards of the 
warning system that would result in loss of the 
train approach warning (wrong-side failure), such 
that no warning or inadequate or discontinuous 
warning would be provided to road users. The 
tolerable hazard rate (THR) for the warning 
function of a LCLCWD was informed by evaluating 
the baseline level crossing risk, the expected risk 
reduction as a result of installing active protection, 
and the additional risk contributed from a 
LCLCWD as a result of having a lower level of 
safety integrity for the warning function (see Figure 
2). 
 
 
Figure 2 – Risk model to determine magnitude 
of risk reduction for LCLCWDs 
Specifying requirements for railway technologies, 
including the quantitative safety targets (THRs), 
allows suppliers to apportion these to constituent 
subsystems that implement the safety function 
(e.g. control system, train or track occupancy 
detection, etc.). As stated earlier, although 
standards for application of RAMS in railway 
applications [11, 12] prescribe the consideration of 
human factors throughout the safety lifecycle, 
there is little to no actual guidance on how to 
Risk Model (Collision 
likelihood for LX with 
passive controls)
Risk Model (Collision 
likelihood for LX with 
flashing lights)
Risk Model
(Collisions due to 
wrong-side failure)
Risk Model
(Collisions due to 
wrong-side failure)
+
−
−
 Conventional WD 
Baseline risk
Risk after upgrade
 LCLCWD F(Collisions|
WSF)
F(Collisions)
F(Collisions)
F(Collisions|WSF)
F(Mitigated
 Collisions)
Australian 
Level Crossing 
Historic Crash 
Data
Theoretical 
Reliability 
Data / 
Operational 
Failure Data
Christian Wullems and Anjum Naweed  Systematic Integration of Human Factors in the Specification of 
Rail CRC, CARRS-Q QUT and Appleton Institute CQU  Requirements for New Railway Technologies 
  Conference On Railway Excellence 
                                                 Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014  
practically integrate human factors analysis in the 
specification of quantitative targets that are 
needed by engineers to implement such systems. 
In many cases, system design, behaviour and 
failure modes can influence human performance at 
the interfaces between humans and the safety 
system.  
The specification of technical requirements often 
tends to focus on hazards within the system 
boundaries, giving little to no consideration to 
design and behaviours of the system can lead 
users to become over-reliant, disregard or mistrust 
the system, potentially resulting in other hazards 
or a degraded level of performance that affects the 
overall magnitude of risk reduction that had been 
estimated for installation of the safety technology. 
If these aspects of the human-system interface are 
not adequately considered, residual risk estimates 
may in fact under-estimate risk, and potentially not 
meet tolerable hazard rates for system hazards. 
Thus, there is a general need to understand how 
system failure modes and behaviour can influence 
human performance or even give rise to other 
hazards that can affect the safety of the overall 
system – ergo, human factors. The next section 
examines two top-level hazards identified in the 
preliminary safety argument for LCLCWDs and 
discusses the challenges that were faced in 
specifying tolerable hazard rates from a holistic 
assessment of risk including both technical and 
human factors performance.  
4. ASSESSING RISK OF LCLCWDS 
The assessment of risk conducted in the 
preliminary safety argument identified two top-level 
hazards for LCLCWDs: 
• Hazard 1: Level crossing warning device 
does not provide adequate warning to 
road users of a rail vehicle while 
approaching or traversing the level 
crossing; and  
• Hazard 2: Level crossing warning device 
leads road users to engage in risk-taking 
behaviour. 
One of the key elements of the risk assessment 
process is to link hazards to fatalities. In this case, 
it was relatively straightforward for Hazard 1, 
where a risk model was developed to estimate the 
likelihood of a failure of the warning function (i.e. 
wrong-side failure) resulting in a fatality. Using 
level crossing survey data of road and rail vehicle 
volumes and an estimate of fatalities per collision 
from historical crash data, the hazard rate was 
linked to fatalities, albeit with some underlying 
assumptions based around persistence of failure. 
In the preliminary modelling, the assumption was 
that failure of the warning function would be 
detected and reported to the train controller, 
therefore limiting the exposure of the failure to the 
traversal of a single rail vehicle. This may well be 
the case for some railways, however, the 
performance of the humans that would be 
fundamentally involved in the process of detecting 
and reporting the failure was not considered. 
Detection of failure is further complicated by the 
myriad of monitoring systems and procedures 
used in different jurisdictions.  
For example, if no remote monitoring function is 
provided, detection of the failure becomes the 
responsibility of the train or maintenance crew.  
Healthy state indications or sidelights can indicate 
to the train driver whether the warning system is 
operating correctly. In this case, persistence of the 
failure is related to the reliability of the train driver 
detecting and reporting the failure, a probability 
that potentially diminishes for each subsequent 
train driver failing to detect and/or report the 
failure. This is supported by ergonomics profiles of 
the ways of working of train drivers, and analyses 
of the way environmental events, disturbances and 
errors are observed, detected and diagnosed 
when managing the environment during train 
driving [13]. 
Alternatively, if a remote monitoring capability is 
provided, it is assumed that only a proportion of 
failures (e.g. discontinuous or late warning) will be 
detected by the monitoring system. Failures that 
compromise the safety function and that fall within 
the diagnostic coverage of the warning system 
should result in the system entering a more 
restrictive “safe” failure state. Undetected failure of 
the level crossing could be detected by correlating 
actual train movements with expected train 
movements. As the persistence of failure 
determines the exposure of the risk to road users, 
the model is sensitive to this assumption and 
therefore requires sensitivity analysis across the 
different monitoring technologies and procedures 
used in various jurisdictions.  
4.1. Level Crossings and Error Producing 
Conditions 
Level crossings are fundamentally complex and 
dynamic socio-technical systems, where degraded 
modes of operation involve numerous procedures. 
Based on draft Australian rules and procedures 
(ANRP), the following is an example scenario 
illustrating the complexity and impact of human 
reliability of a series of procedures on the level of 
exposure to road users of the failure. 
• The level crossing failure is detected either 
via remote monitoring or reports of failure 
from the train crew. Network control 
officers must become aware of the failure, 
for example via a human-machine 
Christian Wullems and Anjum Naweed  Systematic Integration of Human Factors in the Specification of 
Rail CRC, CARRS-Q QUT and Appleton Institute CQU  Requirements for New Railway Technologies 
  Conference On Railway Excellence 
                                                 Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014  
interface communications from train crew 
of the level crossing failure. 
• Network control officers must warn rail 
traffic crews if a level crossing with active 
controls is faulty or potentially faulty. This 
is likely to happen using radio 
communications. 
• Rail traffic crews are required to approach 
faulty level crossing at a speed allowing 
them to stop short of the level crossing. 
• The rail vehicle can only proceed if safe to 
do so. 
Error producing conditions can severely impact the 
performance of humans performing tasks of the 
above procedures. An example of error producing 
conditions includes: 
• Alarm flooding in the control room, where 
network officers are inundated with 
multiple failure warnings. For example, 
environmental influences such as 
lightening strikes may cause multiple 
equipment failures contemporaneously. 
False alarms can also contribute to 
network control officers disregarding 
legitimate warnings. 
• The train could be a significant distance 
from the faulty level crossing requiring the 
use of the driver’s long-term memory. The 
train driver could simply forget to approach 
the faulty level crossing at a speed 
allowing them to stop. 
• Verbal communication used to 
communicate complex information, where 
there can be reliability issues in 
miscommunication of information such as 
level crossing locations. 
In order to quantify the reliability of these 
procedures for use in the sensitivity analysis, the 
Railway Action Reliability Assessment tool [8, 14-
16] will be used. Although in its infancy, this tool 
that has been developed for the rail industry for 
the quantification of human error, allowing it to be 
considered as part of a larger risk assessment. 
The process involves performing a task analysis of 
the relevant procedures, selection of the generic 
task type from the tool, identification, selection and 
review of error producing conditions (EPCs) 
including estimation of the EPC’s effect on the task 
and finally calculation of the human error 
probability using the formulas stipulated by the 
tool. This tool works for trained personnel where 
the performance envelope of such individuals can 
be reasonably determined based on evidence 
supported by observation and other forms of data 
collection.  
Assessing risk for Hazard 2 is significantly more 
complicated to quantify than Hazard 1, as the 
performance range of road users (general public) 
is invariably large. Thus, there are several factors 
regarding the design of the road interface of level 
crossings that need to be taken into consideration 
when evaluating this hazard. Right-side failures 
have been identified as a major contributor to 
Hazard 1, but unlike the type of failure discussed 
in Hazard 1 (where risk is associated with the train 
approaching with no or insufficient warning), this 
failure type is detected by the warning system and 
results in the system entering a fail-safe state. 
From a technical “within system boundary” 
perspective, the fail-safe state is a more restrictive 
state that, in theory, prevents road traffic from 
entering the rail corridor. However, this is 
complicated rather spectacularly by the interface 
with humans, where design of the system can 
potentially lead humans to engage in extreme risk 
taking behaviour (figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Not all safe failure states outside warning device system boundary are safe 
In Australia, the RX5 flashing light assembly [17], 
consisting of a pair of alternatively flashing red 
lights, indicates the approach of a train and signals 
to road users that they must not traverse the 
crossing. This is also the same indication for the 
“safe” failure state. A key issue with the design is 
that road users are not able to differentiate the 
train approach warning from the failure mode, 
leading to mode confusion. 
According to the Queensland Road code (pp. 66) 
[18]: 
“A driver must not enter a level crossing if— 
(a) Warning lights (for example, twin red lights 
or rotating red lights) are operating or warning 
bells are ringing; or 
(b) A gate, boom or barrier at the crossing is 
closed or is opening or closing; or  
(c) … 
Maximum penalty – 20 penalty units.” 
 
However, it is not reasonable to assume level 
crossing users will wait indefinitely. A regular user 
of a failed level crossing may encounter the same 
level crossing several times in succession for 
prolonged failure or on occasion for intermittent 
failure. Frequent exposure to failure can condition 
level crossing users to loose confidence in 
warning, potentially affecting their performance at 
other level crossings. Error producing conditions 
such as expectations of when trains run (known 
schedules) can engender a mismatch between 
actual and perceived risk in the mental model of 
level crossing users, for when a warning is 
credible. Currently, all Australian level crossings 
must have a road user interface that complies with 
the standard AS1742.7 [18]. These issues 
therefore need to be taken into consideration for 
all level crossings, whether new LCLCWDs or 
existing technology. 
4.2. Quantifying Reliability Targets 
Given that failures which result in a so-called “safe 
state” can also give rise to hazards leading to the 
system-hazard: collision between road and rail 
vehicle, system reliability becomes an important 
albeit indirect safety-related consideration. Safety 
requirements therefore need to include appropriate 
reliability targets in addition to safety integrity 
targets, however quantification of these targets 
remains an issue if we cannot establish a link 
between “system leading road user to engage in 
risk-taking behaviour” and fatalities. However, this 
hazard had not been quantified in the preliminary 
safety argument, as there was no quantitative 
evidence available linking the hazard to fatalities. 
While there is anecdotal evidence on this 
relationship, quantifying it will require further 
research in providing a suitable base of evidence. 
The approach being investigated involves using a 
failure mode effect and criticality analysis 
(FMECA) of the system to identify failure modes 
that revert the system to a “safe” failure state. 
Existing literature and simulation research are 
possible sources of data that can be used to 
inform the development of a model for road user 
reliability, taking into consideration the degradation 
in performance (loss of confidence in warning) 
from exposure to the failure and possible recovery 
in performance following restoration of the system. 
The model would need to consider the probability 
of the road user traversing the level crossing when 
the warning device is in a right-side failure state, 
the probability of the road vehicle colliding with a 
train taking into consideration environmental 
factors and sighting conditions at the crossing, and 
error producing conditions that affect the reliability 
of the perception of the warning and decision-
making process (i.e. traversal when safe, looking 
for trains before crossing). 
In our experience of developing this argument to 
 
 
Figure 4 – Graphical model illustrating the dynamic between the software engineering and 
cognitive psychology disciplines experienced in the case study. 
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date, a robust understanding of human behaviour 
and psychology is fundamental for informing 
quantitative models. There is a clear need to bring 
together both disciplines to facilitate the 
specification and design of systems optimised for 
humans, rather than requiring humans to make 
procedures to deal with complex and misleading 
system states.  
5. Conceptualising Collaboration in the Case 
Study 
To reiterate an important point made at the start of 
this paper, the LCLCWD project was comprised of 
software engineers and cognitive psychologists 
(amongst other team members). These 
collaborative dynamics can be (1) multidisciplinary, 
(2) cross-disciplinary, (3) transdisciplinary, or (4) 
interdisciplinary The latter is the apogee of 
collaboration, and involves combining two or more 
disciplines, fields of study, or professions, much 
like the discipline of human factors has with 
engineering and the study of human behaviour. 
Achieving this type of collaboration in systems 
design is difficult, particularly as the engineers or 
designers that would be following performance-
based standards for the development or 
specification of safety-related systems are unlikely 
to have a human factors practitioner on their team. 
Additionally, not all projects would have the critical 
mass of expertise that would be required to foster 
these engagements. Thus, for the purpose of this 
case study and the audience at CORE 2014, we 
have conceptualised the collaboration in a simple 
graphical model, tailored specifically to the work 
that was conducted in the project.  
Figure 4 provides a clear indication of the two 
disciplines using the foundations of 
transdisciplinarity [6]. The view of opposing and 
conflicting principles between engineering and 
psychology were originally apparent, but through 
the process of continued cross-disciplinary work 
and sharing of ideas, these views evolved and 
fundamentally transcended knowledge. In this 
way, the lack of specification in the standards was 
compensated with the guidance and initiatives that 
came out of the dynamic. Reading the graphical 
model from bottom to top, it refers to what is 
known (i.e. existing knowledge), what people are 
capable of (i.e. their capabilities), what they want 
to do (i.e. desired action), and lastly, how it is 
achieved (i.e. underlying motivation). The graph 
illustrates that coordination of a higher-level aim is 
needed to share knowledge and collaborate 
effectively, but more often than not an exchange of 
knowledge starts at an empirical level (at the 
bottom) and must travel from pragmatic and 
normative layers to the value level at the top. At 
the outset, key individuals in what became the 
project team rarely looked beyond their own 
knowledge and capabilities, and viewed the 
subject in in highly discipline-oriented terms. The 
continual sharing of knowledge and perspectives 
eventually converged with an understanding and 
appreciation of the underlying motivators – i.e. the 
values and philosophies upon which each 
discipline was based. Strikingly, these shared 
more similarities than they did differences. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has described a case study for the 
development of a safety argument for new low-
cost level crossing warning devices through an 
integrated approach to engineering and human 
factors. The authors’ have described the 
collaborative dynamic that emerged as a result of 
the project’s requirement to understand how 
human performance affected the safety of the 
larger socio-technical level crossing system, and 
how the technology could potentially influence 
human performance as a result of intermittent or 
prolonged exposure to failure modes that are 
deemed safe within the warning device’s system 
boundary, but potentially give rise to other hazards 
when considered in the larger socio-technical 
context.  
The paper discussed the need to have an 
integrated approach to the specification of safety 
requirements, allowing human performance 
considerations to be integrated into quantitative 
risk assessment. 
The paper concluded with a discussion on the 
conceptualization of the collaboration dynamic 
between the disciplines of engineering and 
psychology that has been and continues to be 
used to facilitate this on-going work.  
REFERENCES 
[1] S. Dekker, Drift into Failure: From Hunting 
Broken Components to Understanding 
Complex Systems. Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 
2011. 
[2] Y. M. Goh, H. Brown, and J. Spickett, 
"Applying systems thinking concepts in the 
analysis of major incidents and safety 
culture," Safety Science, vol. 48, pp. 302-
309, 2010. 
[3] S. Dekker, P. Cilliers, and J.-H. Hofmeyr, 
"The complexity of failure: Implications of 
complexity theory for safety 
investigations," Safety Science, vol. 49, 
pp. 939-945, 2011. 
[4] A. Naweed and G. Balakrishnan, "That 
train has already left the station! Improving 
the fidelity of a railway safety research 
simulator at post-deployment," 
Proceedings of the Institution of 
Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of 
Christian Wullems and Anjum Naweed  Systematic Integration of Human Factors in the Specification of 
Rail CRC, CARRS-Q QUT and Appleton Institute CQU  Requirements for New Railway Technologies 
  Conference On Railway Excellence 
                                                 Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014  
Rail and Rapid Transit, vol. 227, pp. 419-
426, 2013. 
[5] T. Horlick-Jones and J. Sime, "Living on 
the border: knowledge, risk and 
transdisciplinarity," Futures, vol. 36, pp. 
441-456, 2004. 
[6] M. A. Max-Neef, "Foundations of 
transdisciplinarity," Ecological Economics, 
vol. 53, pp. 5-16, 2005. 
[7] J. Thompson Klein, "Prospects for 
transdisciplinarity," Futures, vol. 36, pp. 
515-526, 2004. 
[8] CENELEC - European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization, 
"EN50126-1 Railway applications - The 
specification and demonstration of 
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and 
Safety (RAMS) - Part 1: Basic 
requirements and generic process," ed, 
2006. 
[9] P. Brindley, G. Suen, and J. Drummond, 
"Part two: Medical simulation: how to build 
a successfull and long-lasting program," 
Canadian Journal of Respiratory Therapy, 
vol. 43, pp. 31-34, 2007. 
[10] Cooperative Researc Centre for Rail 
Innovation. (2013, 6th November 2013). 
Low cost RLX risk and Legal Evaluation. 
Available: 
http://www.railcrc.net.au/project/project/lo
w_cost_rlx_risk_and_legal_evaluation 
[11] C. Wullems, "Low Cost Railway Level 
Crossings," in Confrence on Railway 
Engineering (CORE2012) Brisbane, 
Australia 2012. 
[12] C. Wullems, R. Baker, G. Beh, P. Upton, 
and R. Wayth, "Trialling Low-cost Level 
Crossing Warning Devices in Australia," 
presented at the World Congress of Rail 
Research (WCRR2013), Sydney, Australia 
2013. 
[13] A. Naweed and G. Balakrishnan, 
"Understanding the visual skills and 
strategies of train drivers in the urban rail 
environment," Work: A Journal of 
Prevention, Assessment and 
Rehabilitation, 2013. 
[14] CENELEC - European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization, 
"EN50128 Railway applications - 
Communication, signalling and processing 
systems: Software for railway control and 
protection system," ed, 2001. 
[15] CENELEC - European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization, 
"EN50129 Railway applications - 
Communication, signalling and processing 
systems: Safety related electronic systems 
for signalling," ed, 2003. 
[16] CENELEC - European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization, 
"EN50126-2 Railway applications - The 
specification and demonstration of 
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and 
Safety (RAMS) - Part 2: Guide to the 
application of EN 50126-1 for safety," ed, 
2007. 
[17] H. Gibson, "Railway Action Reliability 
Assessment User Manual - A technique 
for the quantification of human error in the 
rail industry," Railway Safety and 
Standards Board Ltd., London2012  
[18] Queensland Transport Operations (Road 
User Management--Road Rules) 
Regulation, 2009, pp. 66. 
 
 
